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The Definition of Metonymy in Ancient Greece

Examining here the definitions of metonymy in the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition will involve, first, a brief review of ancient Greek rhetoric, in particular its main representatives, its main arguments, purposes, and methods, and its basic concepts. Second, it will require the interpretation of the two most important traditional definitions of this particular trope; and, third, it will include discussion of what ancient Greek rhetors explicitly called metonymy, giving examples (i.e., in manuals on *elocutio*) or interpreting literary phenomena (i.e., in commentaries on this or that ancient Greek text). This discussion of the different ancient Greek concepts of metonymy will emerge as being important both for an understanding of the roots of the concept and for a delineation of the issues involved in defining the literary use of metonymy. In fact, it will bring to light, for both the linguist and the literary critic, a significant chapter in the definition of metonymy.[1]

1. Ancient Greek Rhetoric

In the ancient Greek world, speeches were important as vehicles of influence and persuasion in both law-courts and deliberative assemblies, as they are depicted in Homeric poems (e.g., in the *Iliad*, where heroes often speak) and in later tragic and historical literature.[2] Consequently, ancient Greeks were concerned with the problem of *how* speeches were best made: this is why ancient rhetoric was defined as the art of persuasion and concerned above all the techniques for effective public speaking, being the product of a systematic reflection on what worked and why in a persuasive speech.

Accordingly, the birth of rhetoric in ancient Greece was connected to the development of the ancient city (the *polis*) and of democracy:[3] in fact, public debates and political disputes forced all citizens to know how to defend their theses and to demolish those of their enemies. Thus, in the late fifth and fourth centuries BCE, an entire generation of philosophers, called the Sophists, focused their attention on persuasion and started to teach people how to make an effective, that is, influential, speech: according to Plutarch, one of them, Gorgias of Leontini, thought that "rhetoric is the art of speaking, which has its force in being the 'author' (i.e., the cause) of persuasion in political speeches concerning all arguments and which creates conviction, not teaching" (Plebe 32-33). This means that they designed rhetoric to *teach* a practical skill, rather than anything else.[4] Up until the

Hellenistic period, rhetorical handbooks were still unsystematic: the first important integrated system was that of Hermagoras, which dates from the second century BCE and which was then borrowed by the Romans, in particular by Cicero (in his own treatise entitled *On Invention* and in the anonymous *Rhetoric to Herennius*, which was attributed to him) in the first century BCE and Quintilian (in his *Education in Oratory*, which dates from the first century CE). The Greek theorists living in the second century CE, one of whom was the famous Hermogenes, were highly innovative: hence the earlier Greek works on rhetoric were considered obsolete and therefore became lost. All we know about them was preserved indirectly, especially through Roman sources.

Consequently, the preserved image of ancient rhetoric seems to be extremely uniform. Despite differences among the theories in Greek rhetoric, we can speak of a relatively common ground among them, so that even different figures of speech such as metalepsis, synecdoche, periphrasis, and so forth were defined through the same concepts. Ancient rhetoric focused on at least five subjects: (1) invention, which concerned identifying the best arguments for, and against, a thesis; (2) the arrangement of the arguments, since an effective organization of speech was thought to be necessary to draw the audience's attention and to create an emotional reaction; (3) delivery, to which also (4) memory was connected; and, above all, (5) expression (in Latin, *elocutio*). This last subject was considered the most powerful, since it was known that arguments would come across better if well expressed, and it was believed that different styles were more appropriate for different tasks. This traditional rhetorical terminology has crossed centuries of philosophical and linguistic culture. Its labels, which were assigned to models of speech argumentation or organization and to speech components on different levels (thematic, stylistic, syntactic, etc.), have resisted the weakening and even the dissolution of the frameworks on which the ancient classificatory system was constructed. Evidently, these labels are still useful to designate facts which nowadays are analyzed through new, different instruments. Rhetorical and grammatical nomenclature have had similar destinies: the most recent theories also use the names of the traditional parts of speech, although they do not appreciate the validity of their ancient definitions. The concepts behind these denominations, however, cannot *simply* be removed: it is unavoidably necessary to understand them, even to be able to break them down. This is why it is useful to examine the ancient definitions of metonymy.

2. Two Definitions of Metonymy

Metonymy is not one of the most widely studied figures of speech in ancient Greek rhetoric.[5] The first datable rhetorical treatise in which a mention of metonymy can be found is by Trypho of Alexandria and dates back to the first century BCE (Wendel 726-44; Baumbach 885-86). It is Trypho who gives us the most complete, precise definition of the trope. The Tryphonean *De tropis* has come down in two versions that presumably derive from the same tradition, the first brief and scant, the second more extensive.[6] The comparison between the two proems shows how

differently the two treatises were planned: while the first one considers fourteen tropes (among them metonymy, which appears on the list between metalepsis and synecdoche), the second itemizes up to twenty-seven figures (and places metonymy, perhaps less correctly, between onomatopoeia and periphrasis, although they do not have much to do with it). The consequence is that both given definitions of metonymy are different, although, on a conceptual level, they can be usefully compared. Each of them represents the starting-point of a different manualistic tradition, and this fact allows us to identify, within the speculation on metonymy, two different trends, even if connected by some kind of relationship.

The larger Περὶ τρόπων describes metonymy as "a word (λέξιc) which means the synonym (τὸ cυνώνυμον) starting from the homonym (ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμωνύμου)" (*Rhetores* 3.195, 20-26). This definition, which was adopted by the anonymous rhetor who wrote *De tropis poeticis* (*Rhetores* 3.209, 8-11; cf. 3, 207-14) and Georges Choeroboscus, who probably was the author of the treatise *De tropis* (*Rhetores* 3.250, 20-21),[7] while insisting on the root of ὄνομα "name," seems at first sight particularly incomprehensible, while it just needs to be explained.

In this passage, Trypho stresses the different phases through which metonymy is created. We cannot forget that in common ancient Greek vocabulary the term μετωνυμία simply means "change of name."[8] The historian Archemachus (third century BCE), who was evidently interested in lexicographical questions, is mentioned as the author of a book entitled *Metonymies*, in which he was concerned with etymological problems related to different entities that changed name above all for historical reasons that can be reconstructed.[9] For this reason, metonymy involved a "change of name": the definition that is given here shows the transitional step (the homonymy) and the result (the synonymy). Consider one of the examples cited by Trypho: how is it that a poet can mean "fire" by saying "Hephaestus" (cf. Choeroboscus, *De tropis* [*Rhetores* 3.250, 20-28]). First, a homonymy is created: the significant "Hephaestus" is split into two different meanings: on the one hand, its literal meaning is preserved ("Hephaestus" means the god); on the other hand, because of the shift of metonymy, a new meaning is created ("Hephaestus" comes to mean also "fire"). Second, the homonymy created in "Hephaestus" has generated a secondary synonymy between "Hephaestus" and "fire." In this way, Trypho has cogently established the difference between synonymy (or metalepsis) and metonymy: in the first case there is no *shift*; therefore, there is no homonymy as a starting point. The fact is that the definition that has been given does not absolutely explain how homonymy is created—that is, what the mechanism is according to which metonymy works, what connects both significants "Hephaestus" and "fire."

In this context, there comes to hand the second, and wider, definition of Trypho II: "Metonymy is a part of speech (μέρος λόγου) which is imposed on a given thing in a literal sense (κυρίως), but which signifies (cημαῖ νον) another given thing according to a type of relationship (κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖ ον)." The difference between both definitions is patent. To start with, the first one limits metonymy to

a λέξιc "a word, an expression," while the second one (at least in the version attributed to Trypho) refers to a "part of speech," therefore something more than a simple word. Then, there is the crucial point—the distinction between proper sense (or natural sense—that is, the zero degree of language) and broad sense, according to which metonymy creates an "unnatural" relationship between the significant and the signification according to what is pertinent. The Greek rhetor uses, in order to define this "relationship," the term οἰκεῖ ον, which is a word connected to οἶκοc "the house": it generally means "familiar, relative" and also "private, personal" (and the expression γῆ οἰκεία is "one's own land"—that is, motherland), "suitable." This is the true innovation in comparison with the first definition: the mechanism according to which a given word, which has a proper sense (i.e., which corresponds to a given entity in reality) ends by signifying a new meaning (i.e., by corresponding to a new entity). It is a connection of "semantic relationship," of "pertinence," between two realities (Rose 126-27). The other versions of this second definition are found, first, in a work attributed to Plutarch, the *De Homero* (2.287-97),[10] where the expression κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖ ον is replaced by the nexus κατὰ ἀναφοράν "according to a relation, a reference," which also seems, in some ways, to be an even vaguer statement than the first one; and, second, in the treatise *De Figuris*, attributed to Kokondrios (*Rhetores* 3.233, 21-22),[11] in which the rhetor says: κατά τινα κοινωνίαν τῶ ν πραγμάτων "according to a certain communion of things (i.e., which are related by metonymy)" instead of κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖ ον. We wonder whether there is a way of establishing more precisely, the sense of this relationship, of this connection, of defining it so cogently as to allow for a differentiation from other similar figures, like metaphor or synecdoche. We can solve the problem by considering the examples of metonymy that were identified by Greek speculation.

3. What Ancient Greek Rhetors Explicitly Called Metonymy

The examples of the so-called τρόποc μετωνυμικόc in ancient Greek rhetoric can be found in two different kinds of text types or genres, with different functions: rhetoric manuals, where they were collected as normative examples, and commentaries, where a student who is analyzing a text identifies that figure in order to give reason for the characteristics of the latter. Obviously, commentators enucleated only those metonymies which were at first sight so incomprehensible that it was impossible for the reader to understand the text fully. On the other hand, those metonymies which can be found as examples in manuals were generally the most common or they came from the most common literary works, especially from Homeric poems. We can also group them according to their nature, as in the following list, whose categories were set up by the ancient Greek rhetors themselves:

  a. Saying the name of a divinity to mean the name of his attributes and vice versa (however, it must be observed that the first case was absolutely more common than the other way round):

"Hares" to signify "iron" (*Trop. poet.* 3, 209, 9 Sp.[12]; Trypho II *Trop.* 9; Choerob. 3, 250, 29-251, 1 Sp.; Kokondrios 3, 233, 30 Sp.; Artemid. 5, 87; *Sch. vet. in Il.* 19, 119a Erbse; Eustath. *ad Il.* 1, 381, 21-22): the first three passages refer to a Homeric passage, *Il.* 13, 444 ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος ὄβριμος' Άρης "there, the violent Ares made it [i.e., his spear] lose its impulse"

"Aphrodite" to signify "sex" (Eustath. *ad Od.* 2, 290, 12-14) in *Od.* 22, 444 ψυχὰς ἐξαφέλησθε καὶ ἐκλελάθωντ' ' Αφροδίτης "you would take their life away and they would forget sexual relationships"

"Wine" to signify "Dionysus" (*Trop. poet.* 3, 209, 10 Sp.; Trypho I *Trop.* 195, 26 Sp. who mentions an anonymous tragic fragment, fr. 570 N[2]: οἶνος μ' ἔπεισε, δαιμόνων ὑπέρτατος "wine, the most powerful of gods, has convinced me," as well as Kokondrios 3, 233, 28-29 Sp. and Choeroboscus 3, 251, 1-3 Sp.)

"Dionysus" to signify "wine" (*Trop. poet.* 3, 209, 11 Sp.; Trypho *Trop.* II 9; Hesych. m 90; Kokondrios 3, 233, 25 Sp., who invents this example: ἐπίσθη δὲ Διονύσῳ κύπελλα "they drank pots of Dionysus")

"Hephaestus" to signify "fire" (Trypho I *Trop.* 3, 195, 22-23 Sp.; Ap. *Lex. hom.* p. 85; Trypho II *Trop.* 9; Choerob. 3, 250, 22-28 Sp.; Ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2; Eustath. *ad Il.* 1, 381, 18-20; *ad Od.* 1, 103, 40-41; Hesych. h 987; *Sch. vet. in Il.* 19, 119a Erbse); all these students refer to *Il.* 2, 426 σπλάγχνα δ' ἄρ' ἀμπείραντες ὑπείρεχον ' Ηφαίστοιο "they held the spitted entrails on fire" (apart from Kokondrios who does not mention any example: 3, 233, 30-31 Sp.)

"Demeter" to signify "wheat" (Trypho I *Trop.* 3, 195, 23-24 Sp.; Trypho II *Trop.* 9; Ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2; Kokondrios 3, 233, 25 Sp.; Eustath. *ad Od.* 1, 103, 40-42; *Sch. in Il.* 5, 500 Nicole): the last two students mention the expression ἀκτὴ Δήμητρος "the tip of wheat" (Eur. fr. 892), while the *De Homero* refers to an otherwise unknown Homeric passage, ἦμος ὄτ' αἰζηοὶ Δημήτερα κωλοτομεῦ σι "when tough as they are, they cut down wheat"[13]

"Eileithuias" to signify "pains" (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 19, 119a 1-2 Erbse), as in this Homeric passage, 19, 119: Ἀλκμήνης δ' ἀπέπαυσε τόκον, σχέθε δ' Ειλειθυίας "she stopped Alcmena's delivery, she stopped her pains"
"Poseidon" to signify "sea" (Eustath. *ad Il.* 1, 381, 21)

b. Saying the thing that is contained (τὸ περιεχόμενον, as Greek rhetors state) by the name of the thing containing it (τὸ περιέχον):

"Choinix" to signify "bread" (Ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 mentions *Od.* 19, 27-28 ὅς κεν ἐμῆ"ς χοίνικος ἅπτηται "he who touches my bread"[14])

"The place where to dance" to signify "the choral dancers" (Philox. fr. 207)

"The house" to signify "things which are in the house" (*Sch. vet. in Od.* 2, 238 Dindorf)

"The pot" to signify "the wine which is in the pot" (Kokondrios 3, 233, 31-234,1 Sp., who mentions a fictitious example: e[κπιε τὸ ποτήριον "he drank the pot")

c.   Saying the thing that contains (τὸ περιέχον) by the name of the thing that is contained (τὸ περιεχόμενον):

"Amphitritis"·to signify "sea" (Kokondrios 3, 234, 2-3 Sp.)

"Thorax" to signify "cuirass" (Mel. *De nat. hom.* p. 90, 1-2; Philox. fr. 106a)

"Head and shoulders" to signify "helmet and shield" (Mel. *De nat. hom.* p. 90, 2-4 Philox. fr. 106a; Porph. *ad Il.* 5, 7; Kokondrios 3, 234, 3-6 Sp.): the passage where we can find this metonymy is *Il.* 5, 7 δαῖ ἐ οἱ πῦ ρ ἀπὸ κρατός τε και ὤμων "she lit a fire from his head and shoulders"

"Gods" to signify "the place where gods are" (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 1, 222d Erbse; *Sch. vet. in Od.* 2, 238 Dindorf)

"Animals" to signify "the place where animals are" (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 1, 222d Erbse; *Sch. vet. in Od.* 2, 238 Dindorf)

d.   Saying the name of a place to signify the name of its inhabitants:

"The sky" to signify "the celestial powers" (Did. *Fr.Ps.*, fr. 153 on *Septuaginta: id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes*, Ps. 18, 2; Bas. *Is.* 1, 12; 13, 271; Orig. *Comm. in Mat.* p. 121,19-126,9 on *Greek-English New Testament*, Mt. 24, 35)

"The earth" to signify "men" (Did. *In Gen.* p. 166,14-167,8 on Gen. 6, 11-12[15]; *Fr. Ps.* fr. 935; Bas. *Is.* 1,12; Orig. *Comm. in Matt.* p. 121,19-126,9 on Mt. 24, 35 again)

"The city" to signify "its inhabitants" (Bas. *Is.* 1, 12; 13, 271)

e.   Saying the name of the instrument to signify the name of the activity:

"Bow" to signify "archery" (Eustath. *ad Il.* 1, 555, 26-28; *Sch. vet. in Il.* 2, 827b Erbse): the students mention *Il.* 2, 827 ᾧ και τόξον

᾽Απόλλων αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν "to whom Apollo himself gave the bow (that is the archery)"

f. Saying the name of the thing that has a quality to signify the name of the quality:

"Rush" to signify "obscurity" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 27, 12 Wendel)

"Aegis of Erebus" (i.e., Hades) to signify "dark aegis" (*Sch. in Il.* 4, 167 Nicole, about ἐρεμνὴν αἰγίδα)

g. Saying the name of the cause to signify the name of the effect[16]:

Ap. Rh. 3, 120: μάργος ῎Ερως "mad Eros" > "Eros who drives people crazy" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 221 Wendel)

Il. 6, 132: μαινομένου Διονύcοιο "Dionysus who is crazy" > "Dionysus who drives people crazy" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 221 Wendel; Kokondrios 3, 234, 8-11 Sp.)

Anacr. fr. 139: τακερὸc δ᾽ ἔρωc "soft love" > "love which softens" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 221 Wendel)

Il. 7, 479: χλωρὸν δέοc "livid fear"[17] > "fear which makes people livid" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 221 Wendel; Kokondrios 3, 234, 7 Sp.)[18]

Ap. Rh. 3, 742: cτυγερὸν δέοc "terrible fear" > "the terrible thing that produces fear" (*Sch. vet. in Ap. Rh. Argon.* 238 Wendel)

Pind., *Ol.* 1, 3: τοῦ πλούτου τοῦ μεγάνοροc "magnanimous richness" > "richness which makes people magnanimous" (*Sch. in Pind., Ol.* 1, 3 Semitelos)

Il. 3, 165: πόλεμον πολύδακρυν "painful war" > "war which causes pain" (Kokondrios 3, 234, 8 Sp.)[19]

The largest group of metonymies is (a). Trypho I gives a simple explanation of metonymy of this type: it is the relation between what has been invented and the inventor. While commenting on *Il.* 2.426, he says: "in fact, Hephaestus is the god who has found fire"; similarly, in *De Hom.* 2, about an otherwise unknown Homeric passage, he says that the poet "means the fruit of wheat, naming it after Demeter who has found it." As regards the same Iliadic passage, Trypho II gives an explanation that is concentrated on the idea of "pertinence": "[the word "Hephaestus," scil.] means 'fire.' which is in correlation with Hephaestus." Eustathius, with regard to the equivalence wheat/Demeter, remembers that the goddess is "responsible ... for flours" and, as to Hephaestus, that "he is the one who controls [ὁ ἐπιστατῶ῾ν] fire."

Several of the examples are indicated as catachrestic ("Hares" to signify "iron" is a metonymy that is typical of the common language, according to Artemidorus, a rhetor of the second century CE) or they are catachrestic but not explicitly defined so. This is the case of the word θώραξ, a polysemous term in ancient Greek that means, in fact, both the cuirass and the thorax, which is the part of the soldier's body protected by the cuirass. The story of this word is reconstructed by Philoxenus, a grammarian of the first century BCE in this way: the original meaning is that of "cuirass," but the same signifier has come to mean "thorax," precisely because of a metonymy. The mechanism could not be described otherwise, since through metonymy we can make the signifier, which means what contains, express what is contained, while in this case the contrary is not valid. What we should stress, however, is the fact that θώραξ in Greek is used indifferently both in the first and in the second meaning and that therefore the trope has become so common that it does not imply anymore a real deviation from everyday language. On the contrary, if we want to speculate on this case, metonymy comes in this discussion of the term as a justification of a linguistic process. Less evident, and much more interesting, is the metonymy that is described as similar and that implies the use of the expression "head and shoulders" to signify "helmet and shield." In this case, in fact, there is a real trope that was used by Homer and has no equivalents in later literature: it works exactly according to the same mechanism of the other one but, unlike it, does not crystallise and is completely isolated and therefore needs to be explained. In this context, we should pay attention to the similar case of χορός, another polyvalent term: it signifies "choral dance" but also "group of dancers" and "the place where they dance." According to the testimony of Philoxenus, the original sense is the one that indicates the place, the second is the one that indicates the choral dancers, and the last meaning is created through metonymy according to the principle that what is contained (the dancers) is meant by the word for the container (the place where the dancers dance). We could wonder, however, whether "contain" is the most appropriate label here. There is surely some local relationship involved, but we have some difficulties in seeing a containment relation.

Both examples of group (f) are meant to explain the etymology of two terms: the above mentioned scholium on a verse of Apollonius Rhodius, showing much imagination, connects the adjective λυγαῖ oc "obscure" to the botanic name λύγoc "rush" and the reason for the relation is that rush can denote obscurity because it is a thick plant;[20] the Homeric scholium, reasonably, ties the adjective ἐρεμνóc "dark" to Ἔρεβoc "Erebos" (which is one of the parts of Hades)—the same name signifying "obscurity, darkness," too.

In this context, we can recall two other examples that have not been referred to because of their particular status and that describe the transfer of a proper name to a common name or vice versa as metonymy. This is a typical way of explaining some linguistic phenomena; for example, we call "Cardigan" a type of woolen jacket, but, originally, Cardigan was the name of the Lord, a hero in the Crimean

war, who was the first to wear it. Similarly Eustathius (*ad Od.* 2, 216, 13-15), speaking about *Od.* 19.518, where Penelope mentions Πανδαρέου κούρη, χλωρηὶc ἀηδών "Pandareus' daughter, a brown nightingale," is convinced that calling this girl "a nightingale" is a sort of metonymy (or rather metalepsis), as she was called Aedon, that means, in fact, "nightingale" (and, according to the legend, she killed her son and was transformed into a nightingale). Choeroboscus (3, 250, 18-20 Sp.), too, says that it is a metonymy that explains the significance of "sodomy," this term being connected to the town of Sodom, where this sexual activity was practiced.

Group (g) has a special status: all these examples can be described also as enallage, that is, a figure that connects an adjective not to the entity to which it would naturally be connected but to another entity in some association with the first one, this relationship being possibly "metonymical." Thus, in the first example, it is not Eros who is mad but his victims (that is, the men and women who fall in love)—which means that Eros, strictly speaking, "drives people crazy" but is not crazy at all. Ancient rhetoric ends by defining also some examples of true enallage as metonymy: it is the case in a scholium to the Hellenistic bucolic poet Theocritus (6, 12), where it is stated that the expression καχλάζοντοc ἐπ' αἰγιαλοῖ o "on the gurgling beach" must, *metonymically*, signify "on the beach by the gurgling sea" (*Sch. vet. in Theocr.* 6, 9-12k Wendel). We can add an *Iliad* scholium (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 1, 417b Erbse) that asserts that defining Achilles as ὀϊζυρόc "mournful" instead of "unhappy" is an example of Homeric metonymy: in fact, it is not Achilles who is mournful but what has happened to him that makes him mourn. Although somewhat different from the last two examples, we can mention here the one made by Georgius Choeroboscus (3, 250, 15-17 Sp.) about a biblical passage (*Ps.* 2.10), where the expression παιδεύθητε πάντεc οἱ κρίνοντεc τὴν γῆ ν "all you that judge the earth, learn!" is interpreted as a metonymy of group (b) and explained in this way: παιδεύθητε πάντεc οἱ κρίνοντεc ἐν τῇ γῇ "all you that judge on the earth, learn!" As Ilaria Torzi states, this is a true enallage concerning the mutation of cases and perhaps here it is connected to metonymy because of the influence of Latin rhetoric, which was less cogent in its definitions (166).[21]

Again, we find another example of the free way in which ancient rhetors use the term "metonymy" in a not yet mentioned scholium: in *Sch. vet. in Pind., Ol.* 9, 34d Drachmann, it is said that in the Pindaric expression μαλεραῖ c ἐπιφλέγων ἀοιδαῖ c "lighting up (a town, scil.) with violent songs," the adjective μαλερόc "violent" signifies, by metonymy, "clear." What must be understood is that μαλερόc is generally connected to fire, as in many Homeric passages (*Il.* 9.242; 20.316. . .) and that its being used to identify these "songs" is due to the presence, in the nexus, of the verb ἐπιφλέγω "light up." This is not, strictly speaking, a metonymy but rather a metaphor or perhaps an enallage (the adjective meaning "violent" being, possibly, transferred from the singer to the song).

As we can infer from the recurrent use of the term metonymy in ancient commentators, we should also point out their habit of describing in this way the causative use of some verbal expressions which were commonly not causative at

all in the ancient Greek language.[22] An ancient scholiast, for example, refers this possible interpretation of the first verse of the *Iliad* (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 1a, 1-2 Erbse): the imperative "sing," which Homer addresses to the Muse ("O goddess, sing to me the wrath of Peleus' son, Achilles"), according to him, must be understood as "make (me) sing," this trope being defined metonymy. This is not an isolated example: the same scholiast mentions a line in the *Odyssey* (2.91: πάντας μέν ῥ' ἔλπει "makes everybody hope," but literally ἔλπω means "I hope"), where ἔλπει "hopes" must mean "makes [everybody] hope" and to which another Iliadic scholium makes reference (1, 434b Erbse: here πέλαcαν "they moved nearer" means πελαιθῆ'ναι ἐποίηcαν "they made it approach"). Perhaps Homer was keen on this trope, as we can find twice the explanation for *Il.* χωcαμένη ce μεθείω "being angry, I leave you" as ἐαθῆ ναι ποιήcω καὶ μιcηθῆ ναι, ὡc καὶ φιληθῆ ναι ἐποίηcα "I make you to be abandoned and hated, as I made you to be loved" (*Sch. vet. in Il.* 3, 414b Erbse; cf. *Sch. in Il.* 3, 414 Nicole) and the identification of this type of metonymy also in *Od.* 10, 450 (λοῦ cεν "washed" instead of λούcαcθαι ἐκέλευcε "ordered to wash," *Sch. vet. in Od.* 10, 450 Dindorf). Other examples, which are called metonymies, of this trope are in Aristophanes (*Sch. in Pl.* 839 Chantry; the passage is mentioned also in Sud. a 4544) and in Pindar (*Sch. vet. in Pind.*, *Ol.* 7, 119a Drachmann).

The feeling is that ancient manuals deal with metonymy to give reasons for some linguistic phenomena, such as the polysemy of θώραξ. On the other hand, the status of this trope is sui generis, since it is not a part of the *ornatus*: a convincing fact under this aspect is the catachresis of the examples which we have mentioned. In fact, we can explain it along two possible lines: on the one hand, it is normal that in a manual there is an accumulation of not particularly brilliant examples for motives of expositive clarity and of easy memorization; on the other hand, probably the Greeks did not particularly love the pithiness of an "excessive" use of metonymy. This is what we can infer, for example, from the philological dispute on *Il.* 5, 7, in the version related by Porphyry in his *Quaestiones homericae*: Homer, in that passage, tells that "she (i.e., Athena) lit a fire from his head and shoulders [scil. of Diomedes]." Zoilus from Ephesus, a commentator of Homer, reproaches the poet because the hero, although literally being on fire, does not risk his life. Moreover, we must stress the only evidence that we know of a description of the style of a specific author, in this case Plato, where it is a question of metonymy among other figures of the *ornatus*, like epithets, metaphors and allegories. As Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who lived in the first century BCE, states in *De Demosthenis elocutione* 5, the Platonic διάλεκτος is criticized because ἄκαῖρος . . . ἐν ται c μετωνυμίαιc "untimely in metonymies." This probably means a certain intolerance towards an excessively free use of this figure, as if it were a metaphor. Anyway, we should not stress the last datum too much: if it can be said that ancient rhetoric was aware of a sort of connection between metaphor and metonymy, this idea was not fully developed and cannot be, if not superficially, compared with some recent issues of modern rhetoric.

Conclusion

Metonymy was not a major focus of interest in ancient Greek rhetoric. There were, nevertheless, attempts to define it, there being two main traditions of definition. None of the attempted definitions, however, give anything like a precise indication of what metonymy is, as we understand it in contemporary figurative studies. They are very vague and could cover a large number of figures, or perhaps any figure (in this aspect they are like many, though not all, ancient definitions of metaphor and allegory). Yet what is really interesting is that these attempted definitions are often accompanied by examples most of which are clear instances of what modern scholars would classify as metonymy. These examples seem to establish very clearly that ancient Greek rhetors had an implicit concept of metonymy very similar to ours but that they were not able, or at least never actually managed, as far as we know, to make this concept explicit.

Notes

[1] Ancient authors and their works are abbreviated according to Liddell-Scott-Jones.

[2] A fuller account should consider the so-called epideictic oratory, which concerns speeches for ceremonial occasions.

[3] On the story of rhetoric, see Kennedy. On the early stages of rhetoric, see Cole; for rhetoric in the Roman period, see Clarke, *Rhetoric*. Stanley Porter has made contributions on a wide range of topics in ancient rhetoric, mainly on the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

[4] At the beginning of the fourth century BCE, rhetoric was still controversial, while by the first century BCE it became part of the core curriculum for all the members of a social elite. On rhetoric in education, see Bonner; Clark 67–143; Clarke, *Higher Education*.

[5] The secondary literature on metonymy in ancient Greek rhetoric is scanty: I know only a dissertation on this subject by Rosiene. See also Martin 268–69, Eisenhut 84, Laubserg 256–60.

[6] Trypho I: *Rhetores* 3.189-206 ; Trypho II: *Rhetores* 3.201-14. Trypho II was first attributed to Gregory of Corinthus, then to Trypho (cf. West 232-33 on the relationship between Trypho I and II). Cf. de Velsen.

[7] His dating is difficult: some think that he lived in the fifth century CE and some in the ninth. He was a grammarian and a teacher. West excludes Choeroboscus as the author of this treatise (232) (*Rhetores* 3.244–56).

[8] See, e.g., Eus. *PE.* 11, 6, 2; Orig. *Comm. in Matt.* 13, 2; 6, 14, 83; *Or. Sib.* 14, 201. 249.

[9] As to Archemachus of Eubea, see Schwartz 456. The work is mentioned by a scholium explaining Apollonius Rhodius 4.262 (Archemachus, fr. 6). To give an example of what the tone of the treatise must have been, it is sufficient to mention

fr. 8, where Archemachus states—rather fancifully—that the very same people first were called Koureti and then their name was changed to Acharnanians, because of historical events. Nevertheless, Archemachus is cited on at least one occasion in connection with Heraclides Ponticus, who was as fanciful as he: cf. fr. 7.

[10] For *De Homero*, see Schrader, Kindstrand, Hillgruber (especially 138–39 on this passage). All the sections concerning figures come from Caecilius Calactes, who lived in the first century BCE and whose fragments are published in *Caecilii Calactini fragmenta* (Caecilius). For Caecilius, see Blass, Caccialanza, Barczat, Schwab.

[11] Kokondrios is an otherwise unknown Byzantine author of a treatise *On Figures* (*Rhetores* 3.230–43). Cf. Gerth 1064, West 230n.1.

[12] This passage must be revised, as the sentence ὄβριμος ῎Αρης lacks the necessary reference to the fact that this expression, which is in any case Homeric, is equal to "iron," as we can infer from the other attestations.

[13] That is, *Epic.* fr. 21 Davies = *SH* fr. 1139.

[14] Cf. Schol. D *ad loc.*; Eustath. *ad Il.* 1853, 60–61.

[15] He exemplifies with many other passages: πᾶ ϲα ἡ γῆ προϲκυνηϲάτωϲάν ϲοι καὶ ψαλλάτωϲάν ϲοι "let all the earth bow to you and sing to you!" (Ps. 65, 4); ἄιϲατε τῷ Κυρίῳ πᾶ ϲα ἡ γῆ "you, all (the people living on) the earth, sing to the Lord!" (Ps. 95, 1); ϲυνετελέϲθηϲαν ὁ οὐρανὸϲ καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ πᾶ ϲ ὁ κόϲμος "the sky and the earth and all the universe were thus brought to an end" (Gen. 2, 1); βλαϲτηϲάτω ἡ γη' "let the earth produce!" (Gen. 1, 11).

[16] Torzi, who discusses the relationship, in Latin rhetoric, between rhetorical figures, rightly observes that, in comparison with Latin manuals, Greek definitions of metonymy do not end by including also alloiosis, apart from Kokondrios (165).

[17] See also *Il.* 8, 77; 17, 67; *Od.* 11, 43. 633; 12, 243, etc.

[18] See Ap. *Lex. Hom.* 168, 10; Eustath. *ad Il.* 1, 239, 27; *Sch. vet. in Il.* 12, 243 Erbse.

[19] Here is another dubious example: in Aristophanes's *Frogs*, the chorus of frogs, which is the protagonist of the comedy, at the very beginning of the play starts its song in honour to Dionysus: "let us sing the shouted song . . ., which we hollered in the Marshes (ἐν Λίμναιϲιν) around the temple of Dionysus Niseus, son of Zeus, when the drunken crowd going in procession (κραιπαλόκωμος . . . ὄχλος) goes towards my sacred enclosure [that is Dionysus's] during the sacred feasts of the Pots (τοῖ ϲι ἱεροῖ ϲι Χύτροιϲι)" (212-19). In the scholium related to this passage, about the adjective κραιπαλόκωμος "going in procession, being drunk," it is said: "this is what we call a metonymy: the song which arises from drunkenness" (*Sch. vet. in Ran.* 216, 13-16 Dübner; cf. Sud. κ 2356). Where does the metonymy lie? The only valid interpretation of these words is the following: Aristophanes speaks of a "drunken procession" instead of speaking of a "procession which sings because of drunkenness." This would be a metonymy of

group (g)—saying the name of the cause (drunkenness) to signify the name of the effect (singing). However, it is not a very good solution: the fact is that in the passage there are many other evident metonymies: e.g., the Marshes, which was the name of an Athenian quarter, or even the Pots, which was the name of an Athenian feast. Perhaps, the scribe who wrote down this scholium misinterpreted his source and fused two scholia, calling a simply compound adjective metonymy. It must be also remembered that in this context it is Dionysus who is being referred to, and as we have shown he was the god of wine and therefore metonymically often exchanged with wine.

[20] We must remember that modern etymology connects the adjective to λύγη "dawn."

[21] On the relationship between enallage and metonymy, see Bonhomme 75–77.

[22] Among the many examples of metonymies recognized by modern scholars, there is no trace of this type: see, e.g., Radden and Kövecses.

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of the interplay between metaphor and metonymy demonstrates how a reader's seemingly unprompted understanding of metaphor in narrative context may actually be decisively shaped by subtle metonymic cues.

LUIGI ARATA, "The Definition of Metonymy in Ancient Greece" / **55**

Metonymy is not one of the most studied figures of speech in ancient Greek rhetoric and is defined by two different manualistic "traditions." Analyzing them and considering the exemplifications of this trope that were identified by Greek speculation leads us to some conclusions. First, ancient manuals deal with metonymy to give reasons for some linguistic phenomena, such as above all polysemy. On the one hand, for expository clarity and ease of memorization, it is normal that in a manual there is an accumulation of not particularly "brilliant" examples; on the other hand, it is probable that the Greeks did not particularly love the pithiness of an "excessive" use of metonymy. Second, as we can infer from the recurrent use of the term *metonymy* in ancient commentators, we should also remember the strange fact of describing in this way the causative use of some verbal expressions that are commonly not causative at all.

ALICE DEIGNAN, "A Corpus Linguistic Perspective on the Relationship between Metonymy and Metaphor" / **72**

Conceptual Metaphor Theory holds that many metaphors have an experiential basis that can be interpreted as metonymic. This has led to the current widely held view that metonymy and metaphor overlap and interact with each other, rather than being opposed, as previously believed. Writers such as Louis Goossens have traced different ways in which the metonymic and metaphorical mappings interact to result in complex linguistic expressions. In this paper, corpus evidence is used to investigate such linguistic expressions in order to trace the interactions of metaphor and metonymy that they realize. Three groups of linguistic expressions are identified, each group realizing a different type of mapping: one is metaphorical, and the other two are different interactions of metonymy and metaphor. Concordances of the lexical structures of the target domain are examined, and it is argued that the different mappings result in different lexical patterns in their respective target domains.